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INTRODUCTION
Road trauma is the biggest killer of young people in the world. Reductions in the incidence and severity of road related trauma is of paramount importance to society, aimed at reducing the personal and economic burden to injured people and flow-on impact to families and the broader community.
The UN estimates that the economic cost of road trauma to developing countries alone is at least $100 billion per year. The emotional cost is impossible to calculate. Yet road trauma is preventable. Australia has demonstrated that investment in road trauma prevention is the single most effective way of reducing the impact that it has on the community.
The effective and efficient operation of insurance markets plays a vital role in improving road safety outcomes. This can be achieved in areas such as the development of insurance products that help reduce the finance burden of injury; providing education and incentives to encourage safer road-user behaviour; pooling of data to help inform decision making and consumer choice; and, seeking to embrace collaborative efforts within competitive environments to provide mutual benefit to stakeholders and society.
This paper provides a brief overview of the nature and characteristics of insurance markets, highlighting key challenges. The paper aims to provide additional insight when developing and considering opportunities for insurance markets to deliver better road safety outcomes. 
OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE PRODUCTS THAT INTERSECT WITH ROAD USERS

Nature of Insurance
Most forms of insurance aim to transfer the exposure to (or risk of) financial loss that an individual or entity (first party) sustains from an incident or event to another party (second party), generally the Insurer.
An ex-ante premium is generally paid by the insuree to create the policy (or to be covered under an insurance scheme). The premium pool so collected is used to fund benefits for eligible claimants covered under the insurance scheme/policy in the event of an incident or event. Beneficiaries of insurance claims may be the first party, and/or another individual/entity (third party) depending on the type and characteristic of insurance scheme/policy. Typically, an insurance scheme/policy has two components, subject to defined thresholds, caps and conditions: a) Benefits that an eligible party is entitled to claim; and b) Indemnification of the first party (covered by the insurance policy or scheme) with respect to financial losses as a result of their negligence that a beneficiary may be entitled to claim (to the extent that the indemnification matches the benefits).
Types of Insurance Utilised by Road Users
Various types of insurance can be utilised by vehicle owners/operators and road users, and often are relied upon as a first resort in the event of an incident or event causing property damage or injury, these are shown in Table 1 .
Amongst most international jurisdictions, General Insurance is utilised to cover motor vehicle property damage and is often a discretionary purchase. Casualty: Auto Liability or Compulsory Third Party (CTP) Insurance and Workers" Compensation is used is utilised to cover personal injury and is a generally a compulsory form of insurance (workers" compensation is sometimes utilised if the injury was sustained in a motor vehicle during the course of employment or journey to/from work).
In some cases, Pubic Liability Insurance can be called upon (for example, a pedal cyclist injured in an accident on a public road with no ability to claim on any of the above forms of insurance may attempt to sue [seek damages] from the Local Authority or Road Authority if the accident occurred as a result of poorly maintained infrastructure). Generally, compulsory for most types of motor vehicle to be legally operated on public road. In many jurisdictions compensation is based on fault or negligence principles, with some jurisdictions offering nofault coverage.
Personal Injury Worker's Compensation
Covers personal injury costs or damages incurred in the course of employment.
Generally compulsory for employers over a certain size. In most jurisdictions compensation is based on nofault principles, with some jurisdictions providing add-on negligence based compensation.
SECOND ORDER INTERSECT
Public Liability Insurance
Covers damages incurred by a third party through injury, death or property damage from the negligence of the insuree.
In most jurisdictions insurance is a discretionary, with compensation based on fault or negligence principles.
Health and disability Insurance
Covers the hospital, medical and like expenses among individuals.
May be a blend of private insurance, and social insurance.
Unemployment Insurance
Provides safety-net level of financial support to those who are unemployed before retirement age yet seeking work
Generally delivered as a form of social insurance and may be means tested to determine eligibility.
Andrew Fronsko -Discussion Paper 2011-25 -© OECD/ITF 2011 7
Key Characteristics of Insurance Products
Key characteristics of the Australian insurance market are explored below and summarised in Table 2 for the purposes of comparison.
Adequacy Objective
Insurance Type Description
Individual Adequacy -Premiums largely determined on an actuarial basis -Redistributive amongst insurees -Standard model for competitive insurance market Social Adequacy -Public tax-transfer system -Benefits related to needs -Social assistance/welfare
Most insurance products are risk rated at least to some extent, in that the premium charged to individual is reflective of their risk (individual adequacy). As it is expensive and impractical to collect detailed information at an individual level to determine risk exposure and behaviour, for the purposes of premium determination, similar groups (cohorts) of an estimated to be of a similar risk profile are determined using one or more rating factors. This implies that cross-subsidies within cohorts will exist (and potentially between rating cohorts).
The Social Adequacy objective is generally associated with social insurance schemes that generally provide cover the whole community as a form of social assistance or welfare.
The following definitions are helpful in attempting to define social insurance:
.. the purpose of social security should be to ensure to everyone up to a sustenance level of income, in return for compulsory contributions … the main instrument to achieve this was to be unified and compulsory social insurance, through which benefits would be paid out in return for premiums (Lord Beveridge 1942; summarised by Lundholm 1991 (Försäkringskassan, Sweden 2001) .
Funding
A fully funded premium when collected for an underwriting period is adequate to cover the expected total cost of claims as they are incurred and ultimately paid. In many forms of social insurance, premiums are levied to cover only the expected cost of claims payments during a period of time (pay-as-you-go or PAYG), the key challenge being intergenerational risk transfers if the premium collected does not yet match the liability incurred for the collection period (especially for long tail no-fault insurance schemes).
Community Rating
In a pure community rated scheme, individuals pay the same premium (or proportional amount relative to their income) irrespective of their risk. Where no community rating applies, premiums can be set based on the insured"s risk (risk-rated). It is possible to have a blend -for example, in CTP insurance in New South Wales, Australia (privately underwritten), premiums for each class of vehicle are set on a risk-rated assessment of an individual"s psycho-demographic characteristics and risk exposure, but subject to restrictions on premium loadings or discounts.
Underwriting
The underwriting of an insurance scheme may be undertaken by either the private sector (where shareholders supply capital and bear the financial risk 1 ). In contrast, insurance schemes may be underwritten by entities owned by the government or public sector (e.g., the Transport Accident Commission, Victoria, Australia) where either an explicit or implicit financial guarantee applies.
Typical Exposure
In long-tailed insurance classes, such as personal injury compensation schemes, there may be many years between the time the claim is made and ultimately paid/finalised (e.g., 4+ years on average). In contrast, with short-tailed schemes such as motor vehicle property damage insurance, claims are generally reported and paid within a short period of time (typically less than one year from the accident date).
Beneficiary Party
The beneficiary of an insurance policy may be the first party (in the case of automobile insurance the owner or operator of the motor vehicle covered by the insurance scheme/policy), or a third party who suffers loss or injury as a result of negligence or actions of the first party.
Claim Order
In some insurance schemes/ policies, the entitlement to access benefits under the policy is not dependent of other sources of insurance or funds the insured may be able to call upon. These are referred to as first-resort schemes, and include CTP Insurance and most General Insurance products. Some schemes/policies can be accessed only after all other avenues are exhausted (last-resort), or subject to means testing with respect to first seeking reliance on ones" own wealth or income generating capacity before a claim can be made.
Participation
Some forms of insurance are compulsory (such as CTP Insurance), whereas others can be a discretionary purchase (such as General Insurance), noting there may be a blended approach such a requiring a minimum level of General Insurance coverage for certain activities (in most US jurisdictions a minimum level of third party motor vehicle property damage insurance is required to legally operate a motor vehicle on a public road). Universal coverage generally applies to social insurance schemes where the entire community is provided cover (such as unemployment insurance, or accident insurance as applies in New Zealand and Saskatchewan).
1
In privately and publicly underwritten schemes in Australia, the financial risk of insurer insolvency or liability arsing from uninsured, unidentified vehicles rests with the government or responsible agency.
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INSURANCE & MOTIVES FOR SAFE ROAD USER BEHAVIOUR
Moral Hazard
Whilst insurance provides social utility through the protection of the assets of the insured, there is an argument that the indemnification of the insured may dull incentives for safe behaviour. This is often referred as "moral hazard" in that the insured has an economic incentive to cause the situation he/she is insured against, an incentive that is not present when he/she is not insured (Mehr, Cammack and Rose 1985, Shavell 1986 ).
The nature of CTP Insurance schemes in providing third party coverage make the dynamics of moral hazard complicated, given the injured party may not offer have full control of the environment and circumstances relating to the accident/injury and the first party is generally indemnified against financial loss. With respect to public safety, the regulation and enforcement of the environment and codification of duties of care and responsibilities through Road Safely legislation reinforce incentives for safe behaviours. Moreover, it is likely that factors such as self-preservation of life and societal attitudes reinforce motives for safe behaviour for both first and third parties. Thus, there are powerful ameliorating factors that can guard against the risk of public safety being compromised due to the existence of a compensation scheme with first party indemnification (Fronsko 2001, p27 ).
Notwithstanding, a number of policy and regulatory responses can be effected to guard against this hazard, including:
-Mandate partial coverage in insurance contracts, or impose deductibles and thresholds -Insurance contracts to stipulate duties on the insured, and penalties for breaches.
Judgement Proof Problem
There is an argument that injurers may lack the assets to pay fully the amount (to the injured) for which they are liable. This may lead to a propensity not to purchase liability insurance and with limited financial assets at risk could lead to a tendency for injurers to engage in excessive risky activities and to fail to exercise adequate care when doing so (Shavell 1986) . A social issue therefore arises -the risk that victims are not fully compensated for losses. This is a key motive for mandating compulsion in motor vehicle liability insurance, in particular that for personal injury.
A number of criticisms of the judgement proof problem have been raised. The argument fails to recognise incentives for preservation of one"s own life/health (or negative externality impacts to loved ones) in evaluating motives to avoid risky activity/behaviour. It also ignores merits of first party insurance and assumes tort remedy is optimal for behavioural incentives.
A summary of potential policy responses to issues identified above is presented at Table  3 .1 below. 
Adapted from Shavell 1986
In Australia, road safety and traffic legislation and associated regulations, mandate minimum safety standards for motor vehicles, and registered motor vehicle categories that may legally operate in public places. Legislation also provides civil and criminal penalties for inappropriate road user behaviours and activities (such as speeding, driving under the influence of drugs and alcohol, mobile phone use while driving, failure to wear a seat belt or helmet, etc). More recently in Australia there has been a move to provide additional powers to police and the courts to manage risky anti-social behaviour such as hoon-driving -refer for example, the recently introduced Anti-Hoon Driver legislation in Victoria, allows police or the courts to immobilise or impound vehicles involved (State Government Victoria 2011).
In concert with the above, statutory and private insurance markets in Australia have responded in various ways to address residual risks associated with moral hazard through the provision of financial incentives and benefit reductions to encourage safe road user behaviours. To illustrate, a brief summary of regimes that operate in Victoria Australia is provided at Table 3 .2 below, noting the extension of incentives into the licensing system to reward long-standing safe driver behaviour. 3 In Common Law CTP Schemes in and NSW, Qld, awards for damages are reduced by a mandatory 25% for failure to wear a seatbelt or helmet.
INSURANCE MARKET DYNAMICS -RESIDUAL ISSUES
Whilst insurance schemes and markets can be structured and regulated to address moral hazard risks, a number of residual challenges remain to ensure alignment with road safety outcomes, summarised in table 4 below. Individual risk rating is too expensive leading to information asymmetry between the insured and insurer.
Cross subsidisation may be imposed as an instrument of redistribution of welfare or wealth which may weaken or be in conflict with price signalling incentives for safe vehicle selection and road user behaviours.
-undisclosed/ unknown risky behaviours of the insured, may lead to Ineffectual price signalling, and good risks pricing out bad leading to insurer financial instability.
-Consumers with propensity to undertake extreme risk activities may be attracted to insurance schemes offering benefits/identification for those activities (eg motor racing), leading to loss of disincentives for risk behaviours and potential insurer/scheme financial instability.
-Community rating of premiums may result in consumer selection of more vulnerable motor vehicle classes than would otherwise be the case were premiums more reflective of risk or cost (eg motorcycles).
-Application of excesses on certain benefits/ indemnities before claims under an insurance policy can be evoked.
-Mandate disclosure and minimum level of insurance coverage for certain highrisk activities.
-Accept that cross-subsidies exist.
Theme / Issue Cause/Consequences Potential Responses Market Imperfections
Missing markets.
Lack of economies leading to high transactional costs.
-Private Insurance markets immature, hence inaccessible to consumers seeking insurance coverage to conduct certain activities.
-Private insurance markets either unwilling or unable to bear the risk for certain activities/ consumer cohorts leading to accessibility and affordability constraints.
-Mandate minimum level of insurance coverage to create critical mass.
-Consider public monopoly underwriting.
Consumer Ignorance and Irrationality
Mitigate reasons why persons do not purchase insurance, or undertake risky activities or behaviours.
-Irrationality e.g. consumers" probability of loss estimates can be erroneous (Diamond, 1977; Feldstein, 1977) , leading to propensity to engage in risky activities and behaviours.
-Ignorance and high cost of public choice and information accessibility (Diamond, 1977) , leading to propensity not to purchase insurance.
-Mandate minimum level of insurance coverage for certain activities,
-Regulation or issue guidelines to ensure consumers are appropriately informed on the accessibility of insurance.
-Prohibition of risky activities and behaviours supported by enforcement.
-Public education and information and dissemination of information on road trauma hazards and promotion of safer road user attitudes and behaviours. 
Theme / Issue Cause/Consequences Potential Responses Competitive Dynamics
Economic imperative for insurers to benefit shareholders in the shortterm as a key priority, rather than broader societal benefit which may have longer term return.
There may exist an incentive to maintain/encourage information asymmetries to protect competitive advantage, and push bad risks to competitors rather than investing is systemwide solutions.
-Insurer"s short-term profit motive may weaken incentives to invest initiatives that yield larger benefit in the longer-term -Insurers may have financial incentive to invest in road safety initiatives that benefit their own clientbase/portfolio, in preference to initiative that impact the broader community where competitors may also benefit from that initiative.
-Levy premiums to fund public safety improvement initiatives (relative to the risk being underwritten) that generate long term community benefit 6 .
-Mandate submission of select datasets to a central repository for public use and analysis.
-Coordination on road safety related activities that insurers may conduct on their client base, to ensure alignment of campaigns across the industry and juristic ions to leverage maximum impact (refer ferromagnetism metaphor in section 6 below).
PUBLIC VS PRIVATE UNDERWRITING
While it is prudent for government (public) insurers to be financially viable and generate a reasonable return on capital, they often have a "whole of scheme" approach, with performance goals more likely to be aligned to the achievement of legislative objectives, which include both financial and social objectives.
As such, public insurers may take longer term view when it comes to road safety investments (e.g., forgo lower short-term profits to invest in road safety programs, with the view to reap longer term benefits in lower premiums and lower societal health and disability costs). The objectives typically associated with Private and Public Underwriting are illustrated in Figure 1 , below. 
Private Underwriting Public Underwriting
Statutory Insurance Schemes
COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM: A POLICY LENS FOR IDEA GENERATION
In light of the above, what can be done to encourage insurance markets and/or incentivise insurers to operate in a manner to improve road safety outcomes to the broader community?
Using the lens of "competitive federalism", insurance schemes (and insurers) are viewed as having freedom to adapt and respond to needs specific to their jurisdiction (or shareholder risk preferences).
A competitive federalism model as it operates in Australia, in theory, allows schemes to adapt and respond to needs specific to the jurisdictional, and provides the opportunity to act as "policy laboratories" that over time jurisdictions may identify and gravitate to policies that demonstrate success (Victorian Government 2003 pp.2-3, Osborne 1988 or stand the test of time. It also provides the opportunity to learn from policy failures in other jurisdictions (Jewett 2001 , Fronsko 1999 ).
The key challenge under the competitive federalism approach is to minimise the risk of destructive competition and coordination failure with respect to road safety outcomes.
To this extent, there is merit in developing and array of cooperative arrangements within the insurance system (with impetus from regulators as appropriate) that may include, and not in order of priority:
-clear articulation of accountabilities within the road safety system (refer Appendices as an example);
-integrated cooperative frameworks to develop and oversee the implementation of various reform measures;
-improve the accessibility of information to the public to make informed choices;
-public education where ignorance or irrationality of risk assessment may be present;
-pooling of scheme data to assist with risk identification, policy development, public education and informed consumer choice;
-benchmarking activities (process and performance) …working group exchanges to share key lessons that can be broadly levered across many jurisdictions; and -coordination of micro-activities among insurers to amplify impact (refer illustrative metaphor below) External Influence Figure 2 . Ferromagnetism Metaphor
GLOSSARY (DEFINITIONS)
Add-on No-Fault
Under add-on no-fault approach, the underlying scheme is common law (without restriction to sue the at-fault party or recover non-economic loss) and a select set of first-party coverage benefits are simply added on.
Contributory Negligence
Reduction of damages based on the plaintiff's failure to take reasonable care for his or her own safety and well-being that contributes to the injuries suffered, the accident causing the damage, or the occurrence of a situation in which injuries are foreseeable (Butterworths. Australian Legal Dictionary).
Common Law
The system of laws developed by successive decisions of the courts and the role of precedent (Industry Commission 1994).
Compulsory Third Party (CTP) Insurance
Indemnity for liability incurred with respect to death or bodily injury, and access to economic and non-economic compensation to first party bodily injury for eligible claimants injured in a motor vehicle accident.
Fault (at-fault)
Negligence; an error or defect in judgment or conduct; any deviation from prudenance, duty, or rectitude; any shortcoming or negligent care or performance resulting from inattention, incapacity, or perversity; a wrong tendency, course or act; bad faith or mismanagement; neglect of duty (Black 1991, p.608 )
First Party
The person [party] responsible for the accident.
Hazard
A condition that may create or increase the chance of loss arising from a given peril (Mehr, Cammack and Rose 1985, p. 23) .
Modified No-Fault
Under a modified no-fault approach, a set of compensation benefits is provided without regard to fault. However, the injured party retains the ability to sue the [at-fault] third party for certain damages that are in excess of no-fault entitlements, provided the injury meets or exceeds a certain threshold.
Moral Hazard
An individual characteristic of the insured that is indifferent to loss ie "what"s there to worry about, I"ve got insurance" (Mehr, Cammack and Rose 1985, p. 23) .
Morale Hazard
An individual characteristic of the insured that increases the probability of loss arising from dishonesty of the insured, eg arson loss (Mehr, Cammack and Rose 1985, p. 23) .
Negligence
The omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those ordinary considerations with ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or the doing something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do.
The law of negligence is founded on reasonable conduct or reasonable care under all circumstances. The Doctrine of negligence rests on duty of care of every person in his conduct towards others from which an injury may result (Black 1991 (Black , p. 1032 .
No-Fault
A type of automobile insurance in which each persons" insurer pays for injury or damage up to a certain limit regardless whether the insured was actually at-fault (adapted from Black 1991 Black , p. 1048 .
Lack of legal blameworthiness (Industry Commission 1994).
Peril
Cause of Loss (Mehr, Cammack and Rose, 1985) .
Second Party
The Insurer that underwrites the Third Party (or First Party) CTP Insurance Policy.
Statutory Compensation Scheme
A scheme or arrangement that is: (i) established by an Australian law; and (ii) under which compensation is payable for particular kinds of injury, loss or damage; and (iii) that is specified in the regulations or that is of a kind specified in the regulations (definition used by Australian Tax Office).
Strict Liability
Liability without fault (Black 1991 (Black , p. 1422 .
Liability for damages without need to prove negligence or fault. The defendant is liable irrespective of an absence of negligence or intention on his/her part and even if he or she took reasonable care to prevent damages (Butterworths. Australian Legal Dictionary).
Third Party
Person(s) [party] injured by the [at-fault] first party.
Tort / Delict
A private or civil wrong, independent of contract, arising from wilful or negligent misconduct in breach of duty owed to an injured person (Industry Commission 1994).
A private or civil wrong or injury, including action for bad faith breach of contract, for which the court will provide remedy in the form of an action for damages (Black 1991 (Black , p.1489 .
Tort (Negligence) / Delict
The tort or negligence consists of the existence of a legal duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant and breach of this duty, there being a proximate causal relationship between the breach and the plaintiffs injury, and damages (adapted from Black 1991 Black , p.1489 Roles of stakeholders Long-term strategic planning and cross-sectoral collaboration are fundamental components of successful education programs for risk awareness and reduction. Many stakeholders have a role to play and responsibilities in this respect: the parallel and collaborative actions of international organisations, governmental bodies, insurance sector representatives, corporate leaders, civil society organisations, and educational institutions should be encouraged.
Role of public sector. The public sector, at all levels (local, regional, national, and supranational), should take a leading role. The public sector"s roles and responsibilities largely depend on the scope and level of hazards and vulnerabilities, existing initiatives, and available resources. The public sector should first set priorities and then focus on coordination and leadership in the development of national or regional programs and policies: public awareness campaigns, informational websites and the distribution of educational material are among the available tools. Support should also be granted to existing programs at local and community level, as well as to private and civic sector initiatives. Special attention should be devoted to the opportunity to incorporate risk awareness and reduction strategies into school curricula and higher-level educational programs. The provision of fiscal incentives (e.g., tax subsidies) may bring attention to cost-effective risk mitigation measures at the individual or business level.
Role of private sector. Private sector initiatives can play an important role; for instance, the research, advocacy and public education efforts of international reinsurers and national insurance companies can provide significant sectoral leadership in developing and promoting physical and financial protection tools for catastrophic risk. Leadership by example can also be provided by corporations through the adoption of employee education programs, risk reduction measures, and business continuity plans.
Role of civic sector. Independent civic organisations and public-civic partnerships addressing natural hazard awareness and disaster risk reduction at community level should be promoted. Grassroots efforts are grounded in the local physical, cultural, economic and political context of a community and they can prove to be extremely effective even if sometimes they may lack sufficient human capital and economic resources. Partnerships with the civic sector, therefore, should be supported and enhanced as part of a holistic, top-down and bottom-up integration strategy. Support should also be provided to community-level preparedness by ensuring that appropriate emergency supplies are available, thus helping well-prepared communities to act as the first line of defence.
Role of international organisations. International organisations and regional and international collaborations can help focus the attention of national governments and policy makers on the importance of natural hazards awareness and disaster risk reduction education programs. International organisations have a key role to play with regard to long-term planning as they are decoupled from the shorter-term political mandates of national, local and local decision-makers. International efforts may also lead to the establishment of transnational platforms and networks aimed at developing a coherent cross-border approach to disaster risk management strategies. (ii) held or had held such a licence but, at the time of the transport accident, it was suspended or had been cancelled; or (iii) in the case of a transport accident occurring on or after the commencement of section 12 of the Transport Accident (Amendment) Act 2000, held or had held such a licence but, at the time of the transport accident, it had not been renewed for at least 3 years; or (d) the person-(i) was, at the time of the transport accident, the driver of or a passenger in a motor vehicle being used for or in connection with or in the commission of an indictable offence, stealing or attempting to steal a motor vehicle, resisting or preventing the lawful apprehension or detention of that 49(1)(bb), (h) or (i) of the Road Safety Act 1986 or under a law that is in relation to that Act a corresponding law.
(5) The compensation under section 44 or 45 in respect of a person to whom subsection (4) applies-(a) is reduced by one-third if the concentration was more than 0.05 and less than 0.12; and (b) is reduced by two-thirds if the concentration was 0.12 or more and less than 0.24; and (c) is not payable if the concentration was 0.24 or more-unless the person satisfies the Commission that the concentration of alcohol in the blood or breath of the person did not contribute in any way to the transport accident.
(5A) The compensation under section 44 or 45 in respect of a person to whom subsection (4A) applies is reduced by one-third unless the person satisfies the Commission that the concentration of drugs in the blood of the person did not contribute in any way to the transport accident.
(6) For the purposes of subsection (1) 
